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Repetitive Trauma as Industrial
Injury in California
By CHARLES LAWRENCE SWEZEY*
AN industrial accident is commonly conceived of as a single traumatic
incident, such as a fall or blow, resulting in physical injury. The Cali-
fornia workmen's compensation law, however, refers to injury rather
than accident,' and the injury may be an accident, a disease, 2 an emo-
tional disorder,8 or a series of unnoticed minor traumatic insults that
become cumulative in effect and cause disability. Cases involving the
latter type of injury have special problems not ordinarily encountered in
an uncomplicated accident case. Among them are pleading, mar-
shalling the requisite proof, ascertaining the date of injury, handling
multiple defendants and predicting the decision of appellate courts on
unresolved questions of law. Exploration of the cases concerned with
industrial injuries resulting from repetitive trauma reveals certain basic
principles and facilitates an understanding of the questions that are yet
to be settled by the courts.
Definition
California Labor Code section 3208 defines injury as including any
injury or disease arising out of the employment. In 1968, section
3208.1 was added to the Labor Code to further define an injury as
being either specific or cumulative, and to describe a cumulative in-
jury as "repetitive mentally or physically traumatic activities extending
over a period of time, the combined effect of which causes any disability
or need for medical treatment."4
The above type of injury, given legislative acknowledgment in
1968, has long been recognized in California compensation cases. For
* A.B., 1943, Cornell University; LL.B., 1948, Stanford University; Referee,
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.
1. CAL. LABoR CODE § 3600.
2. Id. § 3208; Swezey, Disease as an Industrial Injury in California, 7 SANTA
CLARA LAw. 205 (1967).
3. Swezey, Emotional Disorders as Industrial Injury in California, 3 LINcoLN
L REv. 112 (1968).
4. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3208.1.
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example, as early as 1920, a hernia resulting from the continued heavy
strains involved in the arduous physical work of an oil truck driver was
held to be compensable. 5 In 1934, a telephone dispatcher was awarded
benefits for disability caused by continual pressure on his elbow;6
12 years later, bursitis resulting from repeated motions of hand and
arm while sewing heavy carpets was recognized as a compensable in-
jury. In 1952, Justice Spence of the California Supreme Court ob-
served that "[s]eparately one day's strain may be slight, but when
added to the strains which have preceded, it becomes a destructive
force," and concluded that the disability which follows is "the result of
one continuous, cumulative injury.""
In Beveridge v. Industrial Accident Commission,9 decided in 1958,
Justice Tobriner restated Justice Spence's description of the cumulative
injury process as follows:
We think the proposition irrefutable that while a succession of
slight injuries in the course of employment may not in themselves
be disabling, their cumulative effect in work effort may become
a destructive force. The fact that a single but slight work strain
may not be disabling does not destroy its causative effect, if in
combination with other such strains, it produces a subsequent dis-
ability. The single strand, entwined with others, makes up the
rope of causation.
The fragmentation of injury, the splintering of symptoms, into
small pieces, the atomization of pain into minor twinges, the piece-
meal contribution of work-effort to final collapse, does not negate
injury. The injury is still there, even if manifested in disintegrated
rather than in total, single impact.'9
This decision was the genesis of a renewed interest in cumulative in-
jury cases, and compensation lawyers now frequently refer to them as
"Beveridge cases." Larson calls them "gradual injuries."" Hanna re-
fers to them variously as "wear and tear injuries,"12 "continuous in-
juries,"" and, of course, by the statutory term, "cumulative injury.' 4
The minor strains that contribute to a cumulative injury are some-
5. Grigsby v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 7 I.A.C. 187 (1920).
6. Searle v. Bay Cities Transp. Co., 20 I.A.C. 42 (1934).
7. Pullman Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 379, 170 P.2d 10 (1946).
8. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 831, 834,
250 P.2d 148, 150 (1952).
9. 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545 (1959).
10. Id. at 594, 346 P.2d at 547.
11. 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 39 (1967).
12. 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 8.03(6) (f) (2d ed. 1968).
13. Id. § 11.01(2)(c).
14. Id. § 18.03(7).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
REPETITIVE TRAUMA
times denominated "microtraumata."' 5  A cumulative injury may con-
sist of a series of specific incidents coupled with daily strains of con-
tinuous heavy work as well as an aggravating effect of repetitive work
strains on preexisting pathology or a specific injury.1
Evidence
Since a cumulative injury cannot be established when based upon
a mere claim thereof,17 its definition is of only academic interest to the
practicing lawyer until he has sufficient concrete evidence to establish
its existence. In order to recover benefits for a cumulative injury, the
injured employee must prove a case against the employer or employers
he elects' 8 to proceed against.' 9 Proof of a series of specific work
injuries will not establish, of itself, a cumulative injury, ° nor does the
fact that disability has its onset while an employee is at work necessarily
mean that the disability arises out of, or because of, his employment.2 '
The employee has the burden of proving a causal relationship
between his work and his disability.22 To sustain this burden he must
produce competent medical evidence connecting an established period
of cumulative employment exposure with the disability.23 A medical
15. Peter Kiewit Sons v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 234 Cal. App. 2d 831, 836,
44 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (1965). Note that under the definition of cumulative injury in
Beveridge, the microtraumata can be either active or passive, but that CAL. LABOR
CODE § 3208.1 refers to "traumatic activities." Quaere: Did section 3208.1 intend
to exclude passive strains such as the repetitive jarring which frequently injures the
spines of tractor operators? Probably not since it also refers to "mental" trauma,
which is generally passive. The use of the word "activities" is unfortunate.
16. Burris v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 419, 433-34
(1968) (en banc).
17. Id. at 431.
18. See discussion of multiple employment in text accompanying notes 80-88
infra. It should be noted that if the employer is insured, as most are, the insurance
carrier steps into the shoes of the employer. Thus, whenever this article refers to the
liability of an employer it means the liability of the employer or his insurance carrier
as the case may be.
19. Reidell v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Comp. Cases 184, 185 (1965).
20. Burris v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 419, 434
(1968).
21. City & County of San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 117 Cal. App. 2d
455, 458, 256 P.2d 81, 83 (1953), quoting George L. Eastman Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 186 Cal. 587, 593, 200 P. 17, 19 (1921).
22. Lundberg v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 436, 439, 445 P.2d
300, 301, 71 Cal. Rptr. 684, 685 (1968); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 19 Cal. 2d 622, 628, 122 P.2d 570, 573 (1942); Newton v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 204 Cal. 185, 188-89, 267 P. 542, 543 (1928).
23. In Peter Kiewit Sons v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 234 Cal. App. 2d 831, 44
Cal. Rptr. 813 (1965), the court, perhaps with tongue in cheek, said: "Back dis-
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opinion on this issue lacks probative value unless its author is acquainted
with the essential facts.24 Moreover, the mere legal conclusion of a
doctor does not furnish a basis for a finding of fact, 25 nor is an ex-
pert opinion any better than the reasons given in support of it.26  The
requisite proof of a cumulative injury, therefore, would seem to be lay
evidence that the applicant was doing a certain type of work or was
exposed to certain stresses and strains, plus well-reasoned medical
opinion to the effect that this work or these stresses and strains caused
disability.
Evidence tending to prove only a possibility of industrial causa-
tion, being conjectural, will not support a finding.27  In addition,
lay testimony does not meet the requisite standard of substantial evi-
dence when the issue is exclusively a matter of medical knowledge.28
However, where, for example, the evidence shows that over a period of
time an employee's work involved substantial lifting, that while engaged
in this work he developed back pain symptomatic of a ruptured disc, and
that such work could cause a ruptured disc, and where there is no evi-
dence of any other injury, the plain inferences are that the lifting was a
continuing, cumulative trauma and that the employment was a contribu-
abilities in particular shout loudly for expert advice. No human ailment has produced
more medico-legal headaches than the aching back. This delicately articulated struc-
ture of nodulated bones, cushioned by cartilaginous bodies and gelatinous material,
interlaced by the complex and sensitive fibers of the cerebrospinal nervous system and
held in array by strands and cords of muscular and ligamentous tissue, is vulnerable to
a vast and bewildering variety of traumatic, pathological, deteriorative ailments and
neurotic manifestations, singly and in diverse combinations. Precise diagnosis often
baffles neurologists and orthopedists. In assessing the respective roles of trauma and
predisposing conditions and of objective and subjective complaints, subtle value judg-
ments may be unavoidable. In the face of this anatomical, physiological and psycho-
logical intricacy, semantically dubious, pseudo-medical jargon infiltrates the conflux of
medicine and jurisprudence. Whiplash, traumatic arthritis, traumatic neurasthenia, and
railroad spine are solecisms in current or past fashion. These verbal conveniences
tempt the medically untrained into complacement substitution of simplicity for com-
plexity. In a field which forces the experts into hypothesis, unaided lay judgment
amounts to nothing more than speculation." Id. at 839-40, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19
(footnotes omitted).
24. Bussa v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 259 Cal. App. 2d 261, 267, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 204, 208 (1968).
25. Granado v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 399, 407, 445 P.2d 294,
300, 71 Cal. Rptr. 678, 684 (1968).
26. Higel v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 753, 757 (Ct.
App. 1968).
27. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 33 Cal. 2d 685, 687, 203
P.2d 747, 748 (1949).
28. City and County of San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 117 Cal.
App. 2d 455, 459-60, 256 P.2d 81, 84 (1953).
[Vol. 21
February 19701
ting factor to the disability. 29 The employment need not be the sole
cause of the disability; it is sufficient to establish that it is a substantial
contributing cause.30
Date of Injury
Since a specific injury occurs as the result of a single incident or
exposure, the date of injury is obviously the date of the incident. A
cumulative injury, however, extends over a period of time, and a
question arises of when the injury occurs. Ascertaining the date of
injury can be important in a given case since it affects the time within
which the action must be filed, the amount of the recovery, the liability,
if any, of the Subsequent Injuries Fund, and the jurisdiction of the
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.31 Furthermore, because the
law in force at the time of injury determines the extent and nature of
the benefits to which an injured employee is entitled, 2 a problem arises
where there is a change in the law during the period of exposure. 3
Temporary disability indemnity is payable only during the five years
immediately following the injury. 4 If an employee has a preexisting
disability on the date of injury, he may be entitled to additional stat-
utory benefits.3 5 The Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board lacks
jurisdiction to amend, alter or rescind its awards unless a petition for
such relief is filed within five years from the date of injury. 6
Labor Code section 3208.1, which became effective January 1,
1969, provides that "the date of cumulative injury shall be the date of
disability caused thereby." At first blush, this section would appear
to conclusively define the date of a cumulative injury, thereby settling
29. Lundberg v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 436, 439, 455 P.2d 300,
302, 71 Cal. Rptr. 684, 686 (1968).
30. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 176 Cal. App. 2d 10, 18,
1 Cal. Rptr. 73, 79 (1959).
31. Since January 15, 1966, the judicial power of the Industrial Accident
Commission has been vested in the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. CAT.
LABOR CODE § 111.
32. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d 388, 182
P.2d 159 (1947).
33. Cf. Argonaut Mining Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 104 Cal. App. 2d 27,
230 P.2d 637 (1951) (increase in the amount of death benefit after exposure to mine
dust); Associated Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 9 Cal. Comp. Cases 244
(Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (increase in the maximum rate for temporary disability indem-
nity after contraction of dermatitis).
34. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4656.
35. Id. H9 4751-55; see Dow Chem. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 67 Cal.
2d 483, 432 P.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967).
36. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5804.
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the matter. However, since the section has yet to be interpreted by
the appellate courts and since it is probably not retroactive,3 7 a brief
review of the prior case law is warranted.
Prior to 1947, it was held that the date of injury in cumulative in-
jury cases was the date on which (1) the repetitive trauma culmi-
nated in incapacity for work and (2) the employee knew, or with
ordinary care should have known, that his disability was caused by his
work. 8 The definition of the date of injury as the day on which dis-
ability and actual or constructive knowledge of its industrial causation
coincide is frequently referred to as the Marsh rule. 9
In 1947, there were added to the chapter of the Labor Code con-
cerned with limitations of proceedings two new sections which limited
the Marsh rule to occupational disease cases and provided that in all
other cases the date of injury was the date of the incident or exposure.40
Pursuant to this change in the law, the supreme court, in Fireman's
Fund Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,41 stated that in
the case of a continuous injury the limitations period runs from the
time of the last exposure.
In Beveridge v. Industrial Accident Commission,42 as frequently
occurs, the date of last exposure and the first day of disability coin-
cided. This coincidence led the court to say, in reference to the statute
of limitations:
In reality the only moment when such injury can be visualized
as taking compensative form is the date of last exposure, when
the cumulative effect causes disability. 43
Within the context of the facts, of course, this was a correct statement
of the rule announced in Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission. However, the court's language was subsequently
taken out of context and used to support what became the commonly
accepted view that the date of a cumulative injury was the date of the
last exposure, or if disability did not appear until later, the first day of
37. Union Tribune Pub. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases
286, 287 (1969).
38. Pullman Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 379, 383-84, 170 P.2d
10, 13 (1946).
39. Marsh v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933)
(occupational disease case holding that the statute of limitations commences running
when disability and knowledge of industrial causation coincide).
40. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5411, 5412.
41. 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952).
42. 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545 (1959).
43. Id. at 594, 346 P.2d at 547.
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disability.44
To add to the confusion, in 1968, the supreme court, in Fruehauf
Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,45 reapplied the
Marsh rule to cumulative injuries by construing the 1947 legislation to
include cumulative injuries within the term occupational disease. It
was in response to this decision that the legislature enacted section 3208.1
of the Labor Code. Although the legislature clearly intended to over-
rule Fruehauf, there are at least two technicalities that may preclude
this result. One is that section 3208.1 is not included in the chapter
on limitations of proceedings, as is the definition of date of injury for
occupational diseases, and it is therefore arguable that at least for the
purposes of the statute of limitations, the Marsh rule, as resurrected by
the Fruehauf case, is still applicable.46  The other is that a statement of
legislative intent reciting that section 3208.1 was intended to nullify
the decision in Fruehauf, erroneously cited the superseded court of
appeal decision, which had held the date of injury to be the date of last
exposure.47
A third possible basis for a varied interpretation is the section
3208.1 definition of cumulative injury as the effect of "traumatic activi-
ties." If this definition is interpreted to be narrower than the Beveridge
definition,4 any cumulative injuries not included within section 3208.1
would continue to be occupational diseases and their date of injury
would be established by the Marsh rule. Since the precise distinction
between certain cumulative injuries and seemingly similar occupational
diseases has never been clear,49 the language of section 3208.1 makes it
possible to construe borderline cumulative injuries as occupational dis-
eases.
It will ultimately be necessary, moreover, to define the word disa-
44. E.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 67 Cal. 2d 483, 493,
432 P.2d 365, 372, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757, 764 (1967) (date for purposes of Subsequent
Injuries Fund); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 29 Cal. Comp. Cases
184, 186 (Ct. App. 1964) (date for purposes of statute of limitations).
45. 68 Cal. 2d 569, 440 P.2d 236, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968).
46. Cf. Argonaut Mining Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 104 Cal. App. 2d 27,
30-31, 230 P.2d 637, 639 (1951).
47. 1968 JOUmNAL OF THE CALiFoRNmA ASSmmLY, 1st Extra. Sess., at 21.
48. See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
49. Swezey, Disease as Industrial Injury in California, 7 SANTA CLAM LAW. 205,
215 (1967). A hearing loss caused by the repetitive trauma of sound waves beating
on the ear drums was considered an occupational disease in Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Comm'n, 29 Cal. Comp. Cases 390 (1964), at the same time that an injury
from repetitive insults to the spine from the jarring of a bus was treated as a
cumulative injury in Jenkins v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 29 Cal. Comp. Cases 126
(1964).
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bility as used in section 3208.1. Does it mean actual incapacity for
work,50 prospective loss of earning power,51 or simply sufficient physi-
cal harm or symptoms to require medical treatment? On principle, the
injury should be held to have occurred whenever the employee's
physical well-being is sufficiently impaired to entitle him to an award
of disability indemnity or medical treatment. The rationale of the
Marsh rule is that an injured employee's rights should not be barred
before they accrue. That is, he has not suffered an injury in the legal
sense until he is entitled to some benefits. 52 The converse would seem
to be equally true. Once the employee becomes entitled to some bene-
fits, the injury has occurred. 53  Such a rule would avoid the
anomalous result, frequently encountered under the Marsh rule, of
awarding benefits for a period prior to the date of injury.
In the final analysis, it can safely be said that how disability is de-
fined will in large measure be determined by the particular factual
situation involved when the matter is presented to the courts, since limi-
tations provisions in the workmen's compensation law must be liberally
construed in favor of the employee.6
4
Pleading
The appropriate manner of pleading a cumulative injury is to allege
that the employee during a particular period of employment was sub-
jected to described stresses and strains, which became cumulative in ef-
fect and resulted in a described disability on a certain date. 55
Careless pleading, however, has not been an obstacle to recovery in
cumulative injury cases. An injured workman is entitled to an adjudica-
tion upon substance rather than upon formality of statement, and awk-
wardness in allegation may not be used to preclude his right to compen-
50. Pullman Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 379, 383, 170 P.2d 10,
13 (1946); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 29 Cal. Comp. Cases 390,
391 (1964) ("actual loss in earning power"); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Ace.
Comm'n, 28 Cal. Comp. Cases 175 (1963) ("incapacity to pursue one's regular job").
51. Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Comp. Cases, 258
(1965); Swezey, Disease as Industrial Injury in California, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 205,
218 (1967).
52. Fruehauf Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 68 Cal. 2d 569, 573, 440 P.2d
236, 238, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164, 166 (1968).
53. Note, however, that CAL. LABOR CODE § 3208.1 itself treats disability and
need for medical treatment in the disjunctive.
54. Fruehauf Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 68 Cal. 2d 569, 577, 440 P.2d
236, 241, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164, 169 (1968).
55. Cf. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 831,
250 P.2d 148 (1952).
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sation. 6 Thus, an allegation of a specific date of injury is not fatal to a
finding of cumulative injury.57 Where an application originally alleges
specific injury but the proved facts support a finding of repetitive trau-
ma, amendment of the application to conform to such proof neither
constitutes a new cause of action nor results in prejudice to the de-
fendant.58 This is apparently true even though the original allegations
lull the defendant into waiving a valid defense. 59
Merger
As has been mentioned above,60 a cumulative injury may consist
of the aggravating effects of continued employment activity follow-
ing a specific injury or it may involve a series of specific incidents
coupled with daily work strains. When the cumulative injury is a result
of the latter situation, the question arises whether separate applications61
must be filed for the specific injuries or whether they can be included in
the application for the cumulative injury. For injuries occurring subse-
quent to January 1, 1969, it is clear that no award based on a cumulative
injury may include disability caused by a specific injury or by another
cumulative injury.62 In addition, where disability or need for medical
treatment results from the combined effects of specific and cumulative
injuries, all issues must be separately determined with respect to each
injury.6 It necessarily follows that each injury should be separately
pleaded.
If the date of the cumulative injury64 is prior to 1969, an entirely
different set of rules may apply. Despite earlier clear statements by
the Industrial Accident Commission,65 and the supreme court in Dow
56. Beveridge v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 598, 346 P.2d
545, 550 (1959).
57. California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 31 Cal. Comp.
Cases 261, 263 (1966).
58. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 29 Cal. Comp. Cases
184, 186-87 (Ct. App. 1964).
59. Guigneaux v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 302 (Ct.
App. 1969).
60. See note 16 supra.
61. The initial pleading in a compensation case is called the application. CAL.
LABOR CODE § 5500. All subsequent pleadings seeking affirmative relief are called
petitions.
62. Id. § 5303.
63. Id. § 3208.2.
64. See discussion of date of injury at text accompanying notes 31-54 supra.
65. James v. Vanion, 28 Cal. Comp. Cases 28, 31 (1963).
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Chemical Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board60 that a
specific injury which caused definable disability should not be sub-
merged in a repetitive trauma claim, a division of the court of appeal
held in DeLuna v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,6 7 that
specific injuries occurring during the period of a cumulative injury be-
come a part of the cumulative injury. Furthermore, the court held that
although an applicant's filing of a claim of specific injury and a claim
of cumulative injury covering the same period of time was not objection-
able, he could not recover an award on both claims. A week later the
same division held in Miller v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board, 8 that a specific injury which would otherwise have been barred by
the statute of limitations was merely the first of many exacerbations con-
tributing to a cumulative injury having its inception on that date. The
supreme court denied a hearing in each case. Thereafter, the appeals
board considered it to be the law that any specific injury occurring at the
beginning of, during, or at the end of a period of cumulative injury
merges into the cumulative injury and, therefore, a separate application
filed for the specific injury should be dismissed.69
The legislative response to the Miller and DeLuna cases was
prompt. 0 Within a year, section 3208.2 was added to the Labor Code
to provide:
When disability, need for medical treatment, or death results
from the combined effects of two or more injuries, either specific,
cumulative, or both, all questions of fact and law shall be separately
determined with respect to each such injury ....
Labor Code section 5303 was amended by adding the words:
[P]rovided, however, that no injury, whether specific or cum-
ulative, shall, for any purpose whatsoever, merge into or form a
part of another injury; nor shall any award based on a cumulative
injury include disability caused by any specific injury or by any
other cumulative injury causing or contributing to the existing dis-
ability ....
Although these amendments would appear to be procedural' 7 and
although the supreme court, when squarely faced with the inconsistency
66. 67 Cal. 2d 483, 492, 432 P.2d 365, 371, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757, 763 (1967),
quoting James v. Vanion, 28 Cal. Comp. Cases 28 (1963).
67. 258 Cal. App. 2d 199, 65 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968).
68. 258 Cal. App. 2d 490, 65 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1968).
69. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases
90 (1969).
70. 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 156, 157 (1968).
71. Statutes effecting changes in procedure or remedy may validly be applied
retroactively, but a statute generally will not be construed to have retrospective
effect unless the legislative intention to give it such effect clearly appears. Tevis v.
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between the Dow Chemical case72 and the Miller and DeLuna cases,
may well disapprove the latter,73 it has been held that the amendments
are not retroactive and that the Miller and DeLuna doctrine of merger
is applicable to all cumulative injuries occurring before 1969. 7 ,
The doctrine of res judicata prevents a specific injury for which
benefits have been awarded in an earlier proceedinge 5 or which has been
the basis for an approved compromise and release76 from merging into a
cumulative injury. The appeals board, moreover, has taken the position
that merger will not serve to resurrect stale claims for temporary disabil-
ity indemnity and past medical treatment arising out of a specific in-
jury.77 This is not to say, however, that temporary disability and need
for medical treatment caused by a cumulative injury prior to the date of
injury is not compensable. It is apparent that under the Marsh rule,
and possibly under Labor Code section 3208.1, substantial medical
expense could be incurred prior to the "date of injury." The victim
of a cumulative injury may recover temporary disability indemnity
and medical expense accrued prior to the date of injury from any
employer whose employment contributed to the disability.78
A single incident that does not rise to the dignity of a specific
injury may still become a part of a cumulative injury. Labor Code
City & County of San Francisco, 43 Cal. 2d 190, 195, 272 P.2d 757, 760 '(1954). The
latter rule of construction, however, will not be followed blindly in complete disregard of
factors which may give a clue to the legislative intent. In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740,
746, 408 P.2d 948, 952, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1965).
72. See note 66 supra.
73. See 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 156 (1968) for an analysis of the three cases and
the legislation which they fostered.
74. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 1 Cal. App. 3d 812,
82 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1969); Union Tribune Pub. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34
Cal. Comp. Cases 286 (1969). In Gallentine v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases
326 (1969), the appeals board held that although sections 3208.1 and 3208.2 and the
amendment to section 5303 may be procedural in form, they could not be applied
retroactively because they had a substantive effect upon the employee's rights and the
employer's liability-e.g., an employee can no longer collect on specific injury claims
which would be barred by the statute of limitations but for the fact that they merged
into a cumulative injury claim that was not barred.
75. Dow Chem. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 67 Cal. 2d 843, 432 P.2d
365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967).
76. Burris v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 419, 430
(1968), contains an extensive discussion of some of the problems raised by the merger
rule. This case was affirmed in all but one minor respect in State Comp. Ins. Fund v.
Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 1 Cal. App. 3d 812, 82 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1969).
77. 33 Cal. Comp. Cases at 427.
78. Id. at 426, 434-35; cf. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 21
Cal. Comp. Cases 117 (1956). See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workmen's Comp. App.
Bd., 1 Cal. App. 3d 812, 82 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1969), for an example of the problems
that arise when the claim for past temporary disability is stale.
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sections 3208.2 and 5303 do not require separate findings for every
twinge of pain but only for specific injuries. An incident is not
an injury unless it causes disability or need for medical treatment. 79
Multiple Employments
It is not uncommon for a construction laborer to have worked for
scores of different employers during the course of the activity causing a
cumulative injury. In such a case, the employee may elect to recover
full compensation benefits from any employer in the chain of causation.
The liability is later apportioned among the successive employers in
a supplemental proceeding."0
Section 5500.5 of the Labor Code sets forth an elaborate procedure
for election and subsequent apportionment. Although by its terms sec-
tion 5500.5 is applicable only to occupational diseases, the procedure
has. by analogy been recognized as appropriate in cumulative injury
cases. 8 ' Briefly, the application should name all employers, and if it
does not, any interested party may request the joinder of additional
defendants. The applicant may elect to proceed against any one or
more of the employers named. If he establishes a case against two or
more employers, he is entitled to a joint and several award. Within
one year after the filing of the award, any employer held liable may
institute proceedings for apportioning the liability and determining the
right of contribution from the other employers. The rights of the em-
ployee are not affected by the supplemental proceeding. There are,
then, two proceedings: one in which the applicant completely litigates
his case against the defendant or defendants of his choice; and a second
in which the defendants litigate their relative rights and liabilities.8 2
The applicant, however, must prove a case against at least one of
the defendants against whom he elects to proceed, or he may not re-
cover.8 3  The appeals board may not award compensation against a
defendant whose employment has not caused or contributed to the dis-
ability or need for medical treatment,8 4 but the employment need not be
79. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3208.1.
80. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 60, 62-63, 403
P.2d 129, 132, 45 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1965).
81. Id.; Raischell & Cottrell, Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 249 Cal. App.
2d 991, 995, 58 Cal. Rptr. 159, 162 (1967).
82. Raischell & Cottrell, Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 249 Cal. App.
2d 991, 58 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1967); Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.,
21 Cal. Comp. Cases 118 (1956).
83. Reidell v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Comp. Cases 184 (1965).
84. Burnis v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 419, 435
(1968).
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the sole cause; it is enough if it substantially and proximately contributed
to the injury. 5 Where the award is joint and several, the appeals board
will generally designate either the last employer" or the employer with
the largest exposure s7 to be primarily responsible for providing benefits.
For an applicant who makes an intelligent election, trial and re-
covery in a cumulative injury claim against multiple employers should not
differ from prosecution of a case where all the repetitive trauma occurred
in a single employment. Attorneys are often reluctant to make an elec-
tion either because of the risk of failure of proof or because of the hope
of coercing a settlement. In the absence of an election, a trial becomes
cumbersome.
It is not an easy task to make an apportionment among the various
employments where an applicant has worked for several employers
and engaged in varying degrees of employment activity. In the ab-
sence of facts making it appear unreasonable, apportionment of
liability in proportion to the duration of each employment exposure is
generally upheld.88
Apportionment
The foregoing discussion relates to apportionment of liability
among defendants who are jointly and severally liable. The term
apportionment is also used in connection with another separate and dis-
tinct principle.89 Much of the confusion surrounding this latter type of
apportionment can be avoided if the principle is discussed in terms of
liability.
Simply stated, the principle is that an employer is not liable for
any disability that his employment neither caused nor contributed to.
Thus, he is neither liable for permanent disability that existed prior to
the injury" nor for any permanent disability resulting from the normal
progression of a preexisting condition apart from the effects of the in-
85. Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884
(1946).
86. Burris v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 419, 435
(1968).
87. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases
90-92 (1969).
88. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 125 Cal. App. 2d 201, 204,
270 P.2d 55, 57 (1954); Zenith Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 31
Cal. Comp. Cases 295 (1966).
89. Granado v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 399, 402-03, 445 P.2d
294, 296-97, 71 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680-81 (1968); see Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 60, 403 P.2d 129, 45 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965).
90. CAL. LABoR CODE § 4750.
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jury.
91
The employer, of course, is liable for all of the direct effects of an
industrial injury. If, moreover, the disability results from the lighting
up or aggravation of a preexisting condition by the industrial exposure,
the employer is required to compensate for the entire disability even
though the employment activity might have caused little or no disability
in a healthier individual." This rule is often reduced to the maxim:
"Industry takes the employee as he is at the time of his employment";93
the effect of the employment activity is sometimes referred to as "the
straw that broke the camel's back."
Since the employment activity need not be the sole cause, but
merely a contributing cause, of the injury,94 it logically follows that the
employer is liable for all the temporary disability and medical treatment
resulting from an injury.9 5
Application of these principles can be illustrated by imagining a
workman who suffered tuberculosis of the spine as a child, which left
him partially disabled. Repetitive bending and lifting in the course of
his employment causes an intervertebral disc to rupture and aggravates
the preexisting tuberculosis. Since the employment activity substan-
tially contributed to the temporary disability and need for medical treat-
ment, the employer is liable for the full amount of the temporary dis-
ability indemnity and medical expense.
When the healing period is over, our hypothetical workman may
be left with permanent disability consisting of the following: (1) the
preexisting disability; (2) disability resulting from the normal prog-
ress of the tuberculosis apart from the effects of the injury; (3) the
disability directly caused by the bending and lifting; and (4) the disabil-
ity caused by the injury's aggravation of the preexisting disease. The
employer is not liable for the first96 and second97 disabilities because the
employment activity neither caused nor contributed to them. He is liable
for the third and fourth9" because the lifting and bending either caused
or contributed to them.
91. Bowler v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 135 Cal. App. 2d 534, 287 P.2d 562
(1955).
92. Tannenbaum v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 2d 615, 617-18, 52 P.2d
215, 216 (1935).
93. See id.
94. See note 30 supra.
95. Granado v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 399, 445 P.2d 294, 71
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1968).
96. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4750.
97. Id. § 4663.
98 See cases cited notes 30 & 92 supra.
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Choice of Theory
A medical witness may find it more comfortable to testify that a
particular disability was caused by strenuous repetitive activity9" than
to say that it was "caused" by a relatively minor trauma which acted as
"the straw that broke the camers back." The doctor, looking at the
latter situation, is likely to feel that the major cause was the preexisting
vulnerability. There is, nonetheless, an injury, and if the minor trauma
arises out of the employment, the ensuing disability is compensable. 10
Being concerned only with legal causation, attorneys representing
injured workmen have traditionally preferred to proceed on the basis of
a specific injury and have resorted to the repetitive trauma theory only
when compelled by the medical evidence or where the factual basis for a
specific injury claim is lacking. The chances of obtaining a prompt
decision are much greater when the case involves one defendant and a
single point in time than when it becomes necessary to explore activities
extending over a prolonged period. The latter situation will probably
be subject to the objections and tactics of a battery of defense lawyers,
each of whom is intent on placing full liability on the others. Adminis-
trative problems, from increased paper work to waste of valuable pro-
fessional time, are also multiplied if the latter remedy is employed.
The theory of repetitive trauma also suffers from the appeals
board's historical adherence to the belief that the legislative scheme
coupled with common sense necessitated a decision based upon a spe-
cific injury whenever a single incident legally caused a definable disabil-
ity.101 This policy does not harm the insurance carriers because, al-
though a carrier may pay more than seemed warranted by "medical
causation" in one case, it will escape liability in another. A rough
apportionment will take place over a period of time by the operation
of actuarial principles. 0
99. E.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 9 Cal. Comp. Cases 294
(1944), where a medical expert said of a nurse's constant lifting of an aged patient,
"numerous sprains of the back were suffered.... Each sprain was at first minor...
until the frequently repeated lifting with a back gradually rendered more and more
vulnerable became so much of an injury and caused so much pain she had to quit." Id.
100. The acceleration, aggravation, or lighting up of a preexisting condition is an
injury in the employment causing it. Fred Gledhill Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 59, 61, 396 P.2d 586, 588, 41 Cal. Rptr. 170, 172 (1964); see
note 92 supra.
101. Burris v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 419,
423 (1968).
102. A "blue ribbon" commission, appointed by the governor with the approval
of the Senate in 1963 to study and report on the workmen's compensation system in
California, considered the consequences of permitting apportionment of liability on the
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The advent of the doctrine of merger,0'0 however, stimulated the
use of cumulative injury claims since they provided a vehicle for re-
covering permanent disability indemnity for injuries for which the
period of limitations had long since expired. The demise of the merger
doctrine will undoubtedly be accompanied by a decreased interest in
cumulative injury claims.
Conclusion
In summary, the proposition that an employer should be as liable
for disability resulting from the cumulative effect of microtraumata as
for the specific effect of a single accident is medically sound and well-
established in the law.
Recent legislation has given statutory recognition to the cumula-
tive injury, has established the procedure to be followed where the vic-
tim of a cumulative injury has also suffered a specific injury, and theo-
retically at least, has defined the date of a cumulative injury with some
degree of finality. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the date-of-injury
definition, however, must await judicial interpretation of the terms
"disability" and "traumatic activities" as used in section 3208.1 of
the Labor Code, and of the significance of that section's placement in the
code.
The cumulative injury claim will continue to be an appropriate
vehicle for obtaining substantial justice where employment exposure
has caused traumatic injury without a specific accident. Its effective-
ness as a device to resurrect stale claims, however, will be markedly
reduced.
basis of medical causation, but except for heart cases, made no recommendations on
the subject. REPORT OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION 119
(April 1965).
103. See text accompanying notes 60-79 supra.
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